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INSURANCE
J. Denson Smith*
It is well settled here and elsewhere that the principle of
estoppel will deprive the insurer of a defense based on false
answers by the insured contained in an application if the answers are inserted in the application by one acting for the insurer without the knowledge or consent of the applicant. The
latter's failure to read the application before signing it is not
considered sufficient to deprive him of the right to claim an
estoppel if he is otherwise in good faith. This principle was
applied in two decisions by courts of appeal during the last
term.' In the Frugg case 2 the argument was made that since
the insured had had the application in his possession for several months before the loss, he was chargeable with knowledge
of the answers inserted therein and could not claim estoppel
against the company. This argument was rejected in an opinion
by Judge Hood on the ground that since the agent had led the
applicant to believe the crucial facts were already known to the
insurer he would have been justified in remaining silent even if
he had seen the answers. In Stugest v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co.,3 the Fourth Circuit held that since the application had been

in the possession of the insured for two months prior to his
death, the beneficiary could not rely on the theory of estoppel.
The Supreme Court, citing the Fruge case, 4 has granted certiorari. The problem is a delicate and important one, and it is
good that the Supreme Court will consider it.
The view that it is not against the public policy of this state
for a policy of automobile liability insurance to exclude from
coverage guests riding in an automobile covered by the policy
was reaffirmed in McCoy v. Royal Indemnity Co.5
In the case of Lincombe v. State Farm Mutual,6 excess cov*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Frug6 v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc., 170 So. 2d 539 (La. App.
(The court also found no intent to deceive, which it considered
3d Cir. 1965).
necessary in view of Gay v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 233 La. 226, 96 So. 2d
497 (1957)) ; Chaffin v. Wabash Life Ins. Co., 166 So. 2d 50 (La. App. 3d Cir.

1964).
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erage provisions in two policies of liability insurance were found
repugnant and both companies were held primarily liable. One
of the policies undertook through its definition of an insured
to deny coverage if other valid and collectible insurance, whether
primary or excess, was available. Such a provision has been
called an "escape" clause, as opposed to an "excess" clause. 7 The
court found no difference between the two types.
In another case involving excess coverage,8 the court found
Civil Code article 3073 authority for the view that a settlement
with a primary insurer which did not exhaust the liability of
the primary did not operate to release the excess insurer. The
release was found not to relate to the cause of action against
the excess insurer. The case also held that, by virtue of the
decision in West v. Monroe Bakery,0 a failure to cooperate by
way of defense cannot be relied on by the insurer.
The Supreme Court has reversed on a writ of review the
case of Broadview Seafoods v. Pierre,'0 which denied to a collision insurer subrogation to the right of the owner of the insured
vehicle which had been damaged in collision with another
through negligence on the part of both drivers. Under the facts
the owner of the vehicle in question was not legally responsible
for the conduct of the driver of its car. The opinion of the
Supreme Court is subject to later review.
The right of an insurer to recover from the tortfeasor the
amount paid to its insured under an uninsured motorist provision was recognized in Gerald v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co."
The case of Younger v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. 12 contains
an excellent discussion of the right of an insured to recover
against his liability insurer because of the failure of the latter
to avail itself of an opportunity to settle the claim prior to suit.
The judgment rendered against the insured was, of course, in
excess of the policy limits. The facts showed that the insured
had consistently insisted from the time of the accident through
the trial that she was not at fault, which position was sustained
7. See the interesting and informative discussion of these types of provisions
and the problem of apportionment between primary as well as excess insurers
in Peterson v. Armstrong, 176 So. 2d 453 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
8. Futch v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 246 La. 688, 166 So. 2d 274 (1964).
9. 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950).
10. 173 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
11. 173 So. 2d 258 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
12. 174 So. 2d 672 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
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by her version of the accident. Unfortunately, the court did
not accept this version. The court recognized that the insurer
should keep the insured informed of compromise offers and of
the possibility of recovery beyond the policy limits but said that
these responsibilities were merely factors to be considered in
determining whether there had been a breach of duty by the
insurer. It also expressed the view that the greater the probability of recovery beyond the policy limits, the greater is the
duty to protect the interest of the insured.
In disposing of a similar problem, the court held in Wooten
v. CentralMut. Ins. Co.13 that the action of the insurer, if wrongful, can be treated as a tort or as the breach of an implied duty
not to use the settlement control provisions of the policy unnecessarily to the detriment of the insured where the interest of
the insurer is not substantially involved.
The view was taken in Rivers v. Brown1 4 that a policy provision defining an assault and battery as an accident unless
committed by or at the direction of the "insured" refers to the
named insured. It was held, therefore, that an assault and battery committed by the president of the insured corporation was
not excluded. A similar provision was correctly applied in Wigginton v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.'
Joint tortfeasors are liable in solido and so are their liability
insurers, within the policy limits, according to Burch v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.1" In consequence, the filing of suit
against one interrupts prescription as to the others.
In this state and others, cases presenting the question of
what constitutes a "collision or upset," as a basis of recovery,
reflect a liberal approach. The shoe was on the other foot in
Manard Molasses Co. v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 7 where claim
was being made for the loss of a truck under a policy which
excluded damage by collision or upset. The truck was destroyed when it was pulled down an embankment by the movement of a ship into which it was feeding molasses by means of
a hose. After reviewing a number of other cases involving similar facts but in which the insured was claiming that the loss
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occurred by collision or upset, the court concluded that the problem could not be dealt with differently depending on the party
to be benefited by the holding and found that the loss was excluded.
An interesting but romantic effort by a household employee
to recover workmen's compensation benefits under a homeowners policy was dismissed by way of summary judgment in
Boudreaux v. Heymann.'8 As the court observed, the plaintiff's
argument was novel.
By Act 464 of 1964, R.S. 22:695 was amended so as to expressly provide that the liability of the insurer under a valued
policy shall not exceed the insurable interest of the insured. In
Roberts v. Houston Fire & Cas. Co., 19 this amendment was held
not applicable to a loss occurring before its effectiveness. The
court expressly followed a prior appellate holding which the
20
Supreme Court refused to review.
In Wilkins v. Allstate Ins. Co.,2 ' a demand for payment upon
an insurer for the purpose of establishing a right to penalties
and attorney fees was recognized as not necessary when the
insurer is informed of the claim and enters into negotiations
for its settlement. Inasmuch as the facts before the court disclosed that after the submission of the claim the insurer took
no action whatsoever, it was held that a demand was necessary
to establish the asserted right.
In Harmon v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,2 2 the Supreme
Court was confronted with a claim for a penalty in the amount
of $50,000, representing double the amount due for loss of the
use of a hand. In rejecting the claim for the penalty the court
took the understandable position that R.S. 22:657 is applicable
to small claims and monthly disability payments and not to a
lump sum obligation such as that before it. Although the evidence left the validity of the claim for loss of the use of the
hand in doubt, certiorari was limited to consideration of the
award of the penalty. In another case, an insurer was held
liable for the penalties provided in R.S. 22:658 for failure to
18.

175 So. 2d 12 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).

19. 168 So. 2d 457 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
20. The Forge, Inc. v. Peerless Cas. Co., 131 So. 2d 838 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1961). See review of this case in 25 LA. L. Rsv. 385 (1965).
21. 173 So. 2d 199 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).

22. 247 La. 263, 170 So. 2d 646 (1965).
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pay within sixty days inasmuch as payment was not tendered
28
until the sixty-first day after the furnishing of proofs of loss.
The theory of estoppel was applied in Travelers Ins. Co. v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. 24 so as to permit recovery by
a workmen's compensation insurer, as subrogee of a principal
contractor, against the insurer of a subcontractor. The latter
had issued a policy of workmen's compensation insurance to
the subcontractor and had given notice of issuance of the policy
to the principal contractor. Subsequently, in compliance with
R.S. 22:636, the policy was cancelled, but notice of the cancellation was not given to the principal contractor. The court concluded that the failure to give such notice operated to the detriment of the principal contractor, in that he could have required
the subcontractor to stop work or secure other insurance. Judge
Hood dissented on the ground that there was no showing of a
change of position by the principal contractor on the basis of
representations made by the defendant insurer.
The principle that an insurer is responsible for negligent
delay in passing on an application for a health policy was relied
on in Locke v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co. 25 The court found in
favor of the insurer since the evidence showed that the applicant was admitted to a hospital within five days of the application, and since the application contained a provision requiring delivery in good health as a condition to the effectiveness
of the policy.
In Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas,26 the court refused to
draw a distinction between the rights of a beneficiary to the
proceeds of a group policy and those of an ordinary life policy.
The Supreme Court has taken up for review the case of
Loubat v. Audubon Life Ins. Co., 27 wherein a certificate of credit
life insurance was erroneously sent by the creditor to the husband of the debtor as the insured. The court of appeal held that
the husband was not covered.
In Soirez v. Great American Ins. Co., 28 the court adhered
to the view that the action of an injured person against a lia23. Steadman v. Pearl Assurance Co., 167
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bility insurer under the direct action statute is in tort and prescribes in one year. At the same time, it was recognized that
if a claimant first gets judgment against an insured who, after
paying, then sues his insurer, the action is in contract. The
29
principal holding was based on Reeves v. Globe Indem. Co.,
which was decided in 1930. It does not appear that subsequent
amendments to the direct action statute require a change in
this view.
A holding that seems to be not in keeping with the intention
of the insurer but that is supportable on the principle of ambiguity was made in Collins v. Government Employees Ins. Co.80
An insured had two automobiles covered under one policy. One
of them had collision coverage but not the other. The latter was
traded for a new car, which was damaged in collision over a
month thereafter. The court sustained insured's claim of collision coverage on the new car. This seems to result in giving
the insured the benefit of collision coverage on both cars after
the trade was made. And for this lie had not paid.

CONFLICT OF LAWS
Joseph Dainow*
Succession of King' centered on an exception of no cause of
action to a petition for annulment of a will, but the real issue
was the validity of an olographic will which had been made
while the testator was domiciled in Louisiana and disposed of
movable property located in Louisiana; but at the time of his
death the testator was domiciled in Florida. In Louisiana, an
olographic will is valid; in Florida, it is not. The petition for
annulment urged the applicability of the Florida law; the court
applied Civil Code article 102 and followed a prior Supreme
29. 185 La. 42, 168 So. 488 (1930).
30. 168 So. 2d 415 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 170 So. 2d 129 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
2. LA. CIVm CODE art. 10 (1870) : "The form and effect of public and private written instruments are governed by the laws and usages of the places
where they are passed or executed.
"But the effect of acts passed in one country to have effect in another
country, is regulated by the laws of the country where such acts are to have
effect.
"The exception made in the second paragraph of this article does not hold,

